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SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON FEDERAL POWER
OVER COMMERCE, 1910-1914 I
By THOMAs REED POWELL*

T

HIS paper and two to follow aim to present narratively such
controversies over congressional power under the commerce
clause as were adjudicated by the Supreme Court of the United
States during the four terms of court beginning in October, 1910,
and ending in June, 1914. To these are added the story of exercises of commerce power that were alleged to offend against constitutional limitations on the national government in favor of individual liberty and property. Mention is made, too, of the more
important interpretations of the scope and effect of the acts of
Congress under review. The footnotes assemble references to
articles and notes in legal periodicals during the quadrennium
of the cases treated in the text. References appended to the citations of the Supreme Court cases are to discussions of those decisions or of the same cases or similar ones in other courts.
References to other law-review material on congressional power
over commerce are subjoined to such more or less appropriate
places in the text as can be discovered. The four years from 1910
to 1914 are chosen not for any intrinsic significance but because
the .decisions of later years have been reviewed elsewhere- and it
is convenient at this time to fill in the gaps of the work of the
court under Chief justice White. The method of treatment is ex*Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia University.
'Review of Supreme Court decisions from 1914 to 1921 appear in 12
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 17-49, 427-457, 640-666, 13 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 47-77,
229-250, 607-633, 14 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 53-73, 19 Mich. L. Rev. 1-34, 117151, 283-323, and 20 Mich. L. Rev. 1-23. Reviews of Supreme Court
decisions from 1910 to 1914 on state power over interstate and foreign
commerce are begun in the current issue of the Columbia Law Review
(December, 1921) and will be continued in succeeding issues.
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pository only and not critical. This method is chosen, not from
motives of modesty, but from a persuasion that there are advantages in allowing the Supreme Court to speak for itself and in
leaving the reader to form his own judgments as to the merits of
the results reached and of the reasons advanced in their support.
Those who yearn to know what others have thought about it will
find ample scope for their energies if they follow the trails pointed
2
out in the references in the footnotes.
I.
COMMERCE A ONG THE SEVERAL STATES
1. The Interstate Commerce Act and 'Its Amendments
The authority to remove discriminations which was vested in
the Interstate Commerce Commission by the Interstate Commerce
Act of February 4, 1887, was held validly exercised in two cases
against the objection that the subject matter regulated was not interstate commerce and so not within the control of the federal
government. In Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Colnmerce Commission' one Young was the lessee of a pier and facilities of a terminal company under a contract whereby the payment
of this stipulated rent relieved him from any other wharfage or
terminal charges. Young bought raw materials in Texas and
other states, shipped them to this wharf in Galveston where he
transformed them into the finished product which he shipped to
foreign ports on vessels loading at the wharf. This manufacture
or concentration at the wharf was held to be but an incident in the
whole process of buying supplies outside of Texas and shipping
2
For articles on various aspects of the general problem of the relation
between federal and state power over commerce see 0. W. Catchings,
"Recent Exercise of Federal Power Under The Commerce Clause of
The Constitution," 1 Va. L. Rev. 44; Frederick H. Cooke, "Nature and
Scope of the Power of Congress to Regulate Commerce," 11 Colum. L.
Rev. 51, "The Source of Authority to Engage in Interstate Commerce,"
24 Harv. L. Rev. 635; "The Gibbons v. Ogden Fetish," 9 Mich. L. Rev.
324, "The Use and Abuse of the Commerce Clause," 10 Mich. L. Rev. 93,
"The Pseudo-Doctrine of the Exclusiveness of the Power of Congress to
Regulate Commerce," 20 Yale L. J. 297, and "The Right to Engage in
Interstate Transportation," 21 Yale L. J. 207; Ernst Freund, "Unifying
Tendencies in American Legislation," 22 Yale L. J. 96; Frank B. Kellogg,
"Federal Incorporation and Control," 20 Yale L. J. 177; Edward Lindsay,
"Wilson Versus The 'Wilson Doctrine,'" 44 Amer. L. Rev. 641; Joseph R.
Long, "Unconstitutional Acts of Congress," 1 Va. L. Rev. 417; Victor
Morawetz, "The Power of Congress to Enact Incorporation Laws and to
Regulate Corporations," 26 Harv. L. Rev. 667; Charles W. Needham,
"The Exclusive Power of Congress Over Interstate Commerce," 11 Colum.
L. Rev. 251; Max Pam, "Powers of Regulation Vested in Congress," 24
Harv. L. Rev. 182; and Dorrance Dibell Snapp, "National Incorporation,"
5 Ill. L. Rev. 414. In 5 II1. L. Rev. 57, 123 various articles on interstate
commerce are reviewed and criticized by Henry Schofield.
3(1911) 219 U. S. 498, 55 L. Ed. 310, 31 S. C. R. 279.
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them through Texas to foreign points. The fact that the shipment was not on through bills of lading was held to make no difference. The contention that the lessor terminal company was not
a public carrier was put to' one side by pointing out that its entire
stock was owned by a railroad company and that it owned the only
track facilities for movement of cars to or from the ships, from or
to the railroads leading to the pier. The pier and the railroads
were united into and managed as. an organized system. Young
enjoyed preferential facilities which competing shippers were
denied and these facilities were facilities of interstate commerce
4
and so within the regulatory power of the national government.
Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co. v. United States,5
commonly called the Shreveport Rate Case, sustained an order of
the Interstate Commerce Commission requiring certain railroads running between Louisiana and Texas points to remove discrimination against interstate commerce by raising
rates for local transportation between Texas points. The
Texas rates had been fixed by the Texas commission
and so far as appears were remunerative. The rates from
Louisiana to Texas had been approved by the Interstate
Commerce Commission as not unreasonable. They were,
however, higher in proportion to distance than the local Texas
rates and therefore operated to the disadvantage of Louisiana
communities. Or, put in another way, the Texas rates were lower
in proportion to distance than the interstate rates and therefore
operated to the advantage of Texas communities. In support of
the decision that the roads should remove the discrimination by
4

For decisions that certain transportation though in some aspects only
between two points in the same state is in reality an integral part of an
interstate shipment and that therefore orders of state commissions are
not applicable thereto, see Railroad Commission v. Worthington, (1912)
225 U. S. 101, 56 L. Ed. 104, 32 S. C. R. 653, commented on in 11 Mich. L.
Rev. 593; Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram. Co., (1913) 227 U. S. 111,
57 L. Ed. 442, 33 S. C. R. 229, commented on in 26 Harv. L. Rev. 554 and
11 'Mich. L. Rev. 593; and Railroad Commission v. Texas & P. R. Co.,
(1913) 229 U. S. 336, 57 L. Ed. 1215, 33 S. C. R. 837. commented on in 2
Georgetown L. J. 23.
5(1914) 234 U. S. 342, 58 L. Ed. 1341, 34 S. C. R. 833. See 2 Calif. L.
Rev. 482, 14 Colum. L. Rev. 583, 607, 9 Ill. L. Rev. 276, and Henry Wolf
Bickl , "Federal Control of Intra-State Railroad Rates," 63 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1; William C. Coleman, "The Evolution of Federal Regulation of
Intra-State Rates," 28 Harv. L. Rev. 34; and John S. Sheppard, Jr.,
"Another Word About the Evolution of the Federal Regulation of IntraState Rates," 28 Harv. L. Rev. 294. In 26 Harv. L. Rev. 757 is a consideration of a decision on the same question in the Commerce Court.
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charging higher intra-state rates in Texas than those authorized
by the Texas Commission, Mr. Justice Hughes said:
"It is unnecessary to repeat what has frequently been said by
this court with respect to the complete and paramount character
of the power confided to Congress to regulate commerce among
the several states. It is of the essence of this power, that, where it
exists, it dominates. Interstate trade was not left to be destroyed
or impeded by the rivalries of local government ...
"Congress is empowered to regulate,--that is, to provide the
law for the government of interstate commerce: to enact 'all appropriate legislation' for its 'protection and advancement . .
to adopt measures 'to promote its growth and ensure its
safety, . . .; 'to foster, protect, control, and restrain . . .' Its

authority, extending to these interstate carriers as instruments of
interstate commerce, necessarily embraces the right to control their
operations in all matters having such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the control is essential or appropriate
to the security of that traffic, to the efficiency of the interstate service, and to the maintenance of conditions under which interstate
commerce may be conducted upon fair terms and without molestation or hindrance. .

.

. Wherever the interstate and intra-

state transactions of carriers are so related that the government of
the one involves the control of the other, it is Congress, and not
the state, that is entitled to prescribe the final and dominant rule,
for otherwise Congress would be denied the exercise of its constitutional authority, and the state, and not the nation, would be
supreme within the national field.6
On the effect of congressional action on inconsistent state action
the learned Justice observed:
"Nor can the attempted exercise of state authority alter the
matter, where Congress has acted, for a state may not authorize
the carrier to do what Congress is entitled to forbid and has forbidden.
"It is to be noted . . .that the power to deal with the rela-

tion between the two kinds of rates, as a relation, lies exclusively
with Congress. It is manifest that the state cannot fix the relation of the carrier's interstate and intra-state charges without
directly interfering with the former, unless it simply follows the
standard set by federal authority ...
"It is also clear that, in removing the injurious discriminations against interstate traffic arising from the relation of intrastate to interstate rates, Congress is not bound to reduce the
latter below what it may deem to be a proper standard, fair to the
carrier and to the public. Otherwise it could prevent the injury
to interstate commerce only by the sacrifice of its judgment as to
interstate rates. Congress is entitled to maintain its own standard
6(1914) 234 U. S. 342, 350-352.
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5

as to these rates, and to forbid any discriminatory action by interstate carriers which will obstruct the freedom of movement of inover their lines in accordance with the terms it
terstate traffic
7
establishes."
The opinion further declared that the power of Congress may
be delegated to the Interstate Commerce Commission. The contention of the roads that Congress had not done so was predicated
on a clause in the Interstate Commerce Act providing that the Act
should not apply to the transportation of property wholly within
one state. Mr. Justice Hughes got around this by saying that the
commission dealt with the relation of rates injuriously affecting
interstate traffic and that the question of this relation is not
simply one of transportation "wholly within one state." The
proviso refers to exclusively intra-state traffic, "separately considered; to the regulation of domestic commerce, as such. The
powers conferred by the act are not thereby limited where interstate commerce itself is involved." Justices Lurton and "Pitney
dissented, but without opinion.
Among the complaints against the enforcement of a reparation
order issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission for charging and collecting unreasonable rates, which came before the
8
court in Baer Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Denver & R. G. R. Co.

was the contention that, since the transportation in question was
between two Colorado points, it was not within the jurisdiction of
the federal commission. But the court found that the carriage
was part of a through shipment from Missouri and held that
"its interstate character could not be destroyed by ignoring
the points of origin and destination, separating the rate into its
component parts, and by charging local rates and issuing local
waybills, attempting to convert an interstate shipment into intrastate transportation."
To this Mr. Justice Lamar added:
"That there was a common arrangement between the two
carriers here was shown by the long-continued course in dealing,
and the division of the freight, with the knowledge that it had
been paid as compensation for the single haul. If there had been
a failure on the part of one of the carriers to file the tariffs, that
did not defeat the jurisdiction of the Commission to award reparation against the same carrier, when it was shown that its unreasonrate of
able charge of 45 cents per cwt. formed a part of the total
9
90 cents per cwt. actually paid by the Baer Company."
MTbid., 353-355.

s(1914) 233 U. S. 479, 58 L. Ed. 1055, 34 S. C. R. 641.
MIid., 491.
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The case held also that under the federal statutes the commission
might issue a reparation order for past unreasonable charges
without at the same time fixing a rate for the future. 10
10

The necessity of action by the Interstate Commerce Commission as a
prerequisite to suit by a shipper for overcharges or discriminations was
affirmed in several cases. The complaint in Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio
R. Co., (1912) 222 U. S. 506, 56 L. Ed. 288, 32 S. C. R. 114, was of a charge
of 50 cents more a ton for coal loaded from wagons than for that loaded
from a tipple. Suit was brought without first getting a reparation order
from the commission. The commission had in fact in other proceedings
declared the discrimination to be unwarranted, but this decision had not
been called to the attention of the trial court and so was dismissed from
consideration on that ground and on the further one that it had not included any finding or direction as to reparation. The denial of the action
was based on a previous decision with respect to an alleged excessive
charge rather than a discrimination, but the court declared that the power
of the commission over the two complaints is the same and that "if a
court acting originally upon either, were to sustain it and award reparation,
the confusing anomaly would be presented of a rate being adjudged to be
violative of the prescribed standards, and yet continuing to be the legal
rate, obligatory upon both carrier and shipper." Earlier in the opinion
Mr. Justice Van Devanter had referred to the elaborate provisions of the
act for investigations and hearings by the commission and to the prohibition against departures from the legally established rate and added:
"When the purpose of the act and the means selected for the accomplishment of that purpose are understood, it is altogether plain that the act
contemplated that such an investigation and order by the designated tribunal, the Interstate Commerce Commission, should be a prerequisite to
the right to seek reparation in the courts because of exactions under an
established schedule alleged to be violative of the prescribed standards.
And this is so, because the existence and the exercise of a right to maintain an action of that character, in the absence of such an investigation
and order, would be repugnant to the declared rule that the rate established
in the mode prescribed should be deemed the legal rate, and obligatory
alike upon carrier and shipper until changed in the manner provided, would
be a derogation of the power expressly delegated to the commission, and
would be destructive of the uniformity and equality which the act was
designed to secure" (222 U. S. 506, 509-510).
This case was followed in Mitchell Coal & Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania
R. Co., (1913) 230 U. S. 247, 57 L. Ed. 1472, 33 S. C. R. 916, where the
complaint was of discrimination because competing shippers had in effect
been given rebates by means of unwarranted allowances for doing their
own hauling from the mine to the station. The court declared that such
allowances are unlawful only when unreasonable and that the question of
reasonableness is primarily one for the commission. The discrimination
complained of arose before the Elkins Act of 1903 which required carriers
to publish their allowances for trackage or haulage services. Nevertheless
Mr. Justice Pitney dissented because he thought that the decisions requiring preliminary action by the commission should be confined to cases
in which the complaint is against rates duly published and approved. He
dissented also in Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (1913) 230
U. S. 304, 57 L. Ed. 1494, 33 S. C. R. 938, which refused to entertain a
suit for an unlawful distribution of cars in the absence of a ruling by the
commission that the distribution adopted was unreasonable, and in Texas
& P. R. Co. v. American Tie & Timber Co., (1914) 234 U. S. 138, 58 L. Ed.
1255, 34 S. C. R. 885, where a similar lack of hospitality was shown to a
complaint against the refusal to accept a shipment of oak railway cross
ties for a point beyond the initial carrier's line when the dispute was
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The question whether a prosecution for discrimination under
the Interstate Commerce Act would lie against Canadian corporations operating only in Canada when they had made an arrangement with American carriers whereby through routes and joint
rates were established with some connecting carriers and not with
others was answered in the affirmative in United States v. Pacific
& A. R. & N. Co." These connecting carriers included American
steamship lines operating between the United States and Alaska
and a company owning and operating wharves in Alaska. Under
whether this commodity was included in the filed tariff fixing joint through
lumber rates.
The opposite result was reached in Pennsylvania R. Co. v. International
Coal Mining Co., (1913) 230 U. S. 184, 57 L. Ed. 1446, 33 S. C. R. 893,
commented on in 19 Colum. L. Rev. 68, 81, and 63 U. Pa. L. Rev. 217, in
which a shipper was held entitled to come at once to the court to sue for
the damages caused by discrimination practiced by violating the published
tariffs in charging competitors less than the published rate. The companies had lawfully raised their rates but had departed from the new
rates and continued the old as to coal contracted to be sold while the old
rates were in force. This was held to be unwarranted and patently so
without any action by the commission, since the new rates were approved
by the commission and the incidental departures therefrom had not been
submitted to it for approval. While the shipper was held to be entitled to
sue without preliminary action by the commission, his judgment for the
difference between the published rate charged him and the lower rate
charged others was set aside, on the ground that the act allowed him the
actual damages suffered but not a participation in the unlawful rebates
granted his competitors. On the denial of damages measured by this discrepancy, Mr. Justice Pitney dissented, insisting that no other measure
would usually be practicable and that this is the measure most likely to be
adopted by the commission in issuing reparation orders.
This decision was followed in Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., (1913) 230 U. S. 304, 57 L. Ed. 1494, 33 S. C. R. 938, with respect to
discrimination produced by granting haulage and trackage allowances to
competitors who in fact did not perform such services. As the railroad
hauled for them as well as for the plaintiffs, its allowance was held a mere
rebate which under no circumstances would be lawful and which therefore
did not inquire preliminary investigation by the commission.
For consideration of various aspects of the judicial enforcement of
rights acquired under the Interstate Commerce Act and its amendments,
see J. Newton Baker, "The Commerce Court-Its Origin, Its Powers and
Its Judges," 20 Yale L. J. 555; Henry Wolf Bickl6, "Jurisdiction of Certain Cases Arising Under the Interstate Commerce Act," 60 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1; George W. Kirchwey, "The Interstate Commerce Commission and the
Judicial Enforcement of the Act to Regulate Commerce," 14 Colum. L.
Rev. 211; and notes in 2 Calif. L. Rev. 154 on the judicial enforcement of
reparation orders; in 14 Colum. L. Rev. 512, 539, on the recovery of
damages under the Interstate Commerce Act; in 25 Harv. L. Rev. 292 on
the power of state courts to entertain suits by carriers to recover difference
between the scheduled rate and the rate charged; in 26 Harv. L. Rev. 665
on denying reparation because of laches; in 10 Mich. L. Rev. 232 on the
jurisdiction of the Commerce Court; in 12 Mich. L. Rev. 135 on whether
an action is one arising under the Interstate Commerce Act.
11(1913) 228 U. S. 87, 57 L. Ed. 742, 31 S. C. R. 443.
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these facts the court held that the Canadian companies were in a
conspiracy to exercise control over transportation in the United
States and were therefore amenable to our laws, both criminal and
civil.' 2

While it is not clear that the issue in United States v. Union
Stock Yard & Transit Co.13 was more than one of statutory con-

struction, Mr. justice Day, in holding that the Interstate Commerce Act, the Elkins Act and the Hepburn Act apply to a stockyard company with tracks and other facilities for transferring cars
from the trunk-line railroads to the yards, observed that it does not
matter that the service is performed wholly in one state if it is a
part of interstate carriage nor that the performance of the service
is distributed among different corporations having common ownership in a holding company. In characterizing the situation he said:
"Together, these companies, as to freight which is being carried
in interstate commerce, engage in transportation within the meaning of the act, and perform services as a railroad when they take
the freight delivered at the stock yards, load it upon cars, and
transport it for a substantial distance upon its journey in interstate
commerce, under a through rate and bill furnished by the trunk
line carrier, or receive it while it is still in progress in interstate
12The question whether the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce
Commission had been extended by Congress to Alaska was answered in
the affirmative in Interstate Commerce Commission v. United States,
(1912) 224 U. S. 474, 56 L. Ed. 849, 32 S. C. R. 556. The original act applied to transportation "from one place in a territory to another place in
the same territory." The commission, however, in declining to entertain
jurisdiction of a petition to compel an Alaska railroad to file tariffs and
establish joint through rates with steamships, had gone on the ground that
the word "territory" referred only to "organized territory," of which the
chief and determining feature "is a local legislature, as distinguished from
a territory having a more rudimentary and less autonomous form of government which it considered Alaska possessed." Mr. Justice McKenna did
not controvert the major premise but denied the truth of the minor one,
referring to previous decisions to the effect that Alaska is an organized
territory notwithstanding the absence of a local legislature. Another
ground of the commission's refusal to act was that the Act of May 14,
1898, which first authorized the construction of railroads in Alaska, provides that the rates shall be posted in accordance with the provisions of
the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, "and such rates shall be subject to
revision and modification by the secretary of the interior," thereby, it was
contended, excluding the operation of other provisions of the Act of 1887
and excluding control by the commission. This was answered by pointing
out that the commission was not given power to prescribe rates until the
Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906, which, it was declared, "entirely superseded
the minor authority which had been conferred upon the secretary of the
interior." A mandamus was granted to compel the commission to take
jurisdiction.
13(1912) 226 U. S. 286, 57 L. Ed. 226, 33 S.C. R. 83. The decision in
the court below is considered in 25 Harv. L. Rev. 741.

FEDERAL POWER OVER COMMERCE

commerce upon a through rate which includes the terminal services
rendered by the two companies, and complete its delivery to the
consignee. They are common carriers because they are made
such by the terms of their charters, hold themselves out as such,
and constantly act in that capacity, and because they are so treated
by the great railroad systems which use them."14
The stockyard company had leased its tracks to a railroad company which paid as rental a proportion of the profits. Both
companies were owned by a holding company. Both were held to
be interstate carriers. A contract between the stockyard company
and a packing company by which the latter was paid $50,000 for
erecting a plant adjacent to the stockyards and for agreeing to buy
only stock moving through the yard or to pay regular charges on
stock not so bought was held to be an unlawful discrimination forbidden by the acts of Congress. 15
14(1912) 226 U. S. 286, 304-305, 57 L. Ed. 226, 33 S. C. R. 83.
15Other issues as to whether payments or allowances by carriers to
shippers for alleged services rendered amount to unlawful preferences or
rebates were considered in three cases.
In United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., (1913) 231 U. S. 274, 58
L. Ed. 218, 34 S. C. R. 75, a reasonable allowance by a carrier to sugar refineries within a ten-mile free lighterage zone for maintenance of a terminal
within that zone and for lightering between that terminal and the rail terminal was held a proper payment for facilities in aid of transportation
and not an illegal preference or discrimination on account of the failure
to pay a similar compensation to refineries outside that ten-mile zone who
are not entitled to free lighterage. The disadvantage of the latter refineries was said to be one arising out of their disadvantageous location
which would still exist if the carrier performed all the duties within the
free lighterage zone instead of hiring others to do part of them.
In Interstate Commerce Commission v. Diffenbaugh, (1911) 222
U. S. 42, 56 L. Ed. 83, 32 S. C. R. 22, considered in 25 Harv.
L. Rev. 456, 478, it was held not to be a preference for a carrier
to allow the owner of an elevator a reasonable compensation for the cost
of transferring grain through his elevator, when such elevator facilities
enable the carrier to keep its cars from being sent beyond the terminus of
its lines and to compete with other carriers having through lines from
grain fields to eastern markets. The commission's orders to cease these
payments were sustained as applied to grain kept in the elevator more
than ten days before being reshipped, but not as to grain retained less than
that time which belonged to the owner and was weighed and graded by
him while in his elevator. This advantage which the elevator owner might
enjoy was said not to be an undue preference or discrimination so long as
the payment by the carrier is no more than reasonable compensation for
the necessary elevator service. Justices McKenna and Hughes, in dissenting insisted that the weighing and grading are no part of transportation
and that for this separate business no compensation may be given.
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Updike Grain Co., (1911) 222 U. S. 215, 56 L.
Ed. 171, 32 S. C. R. 39, held that the carrier may not make its payment to
an elevator conditional on unreasonable requirements as to return of the
empty cars when under the circumstances disclosed this would discriminate
in favor of certain shippers against others to whom the same requirements
would be less onerous.
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The "long and short haul" clause of the original Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887 forbade interstate carriers to charge
greater compensation for transportation, "under substantially
similar circumstances and conditions" for a shorter than for a
longer haul over the same route. This was amended by the Act of
June 18, 1910, by omitting the qualification "under substantially
similar circumstances and conditions" and by vesting power in the
Interstate Commerce Commission to authorize greater charges
for a shorter than for a longer haul. The Intermountain Rate
Cases (United States v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.) 16 involved
action by the commission refusing to allow carriers to continue the
existing rates from ocean to interior points which were higher
than the rates for the same distance as a part of ocean to ocean
traffic, but sanctioning certain modifications prescribed by the
commission. A contention that the specific action of the commission took property without due process -was answered by pointing
out that it had already been held that "a general enforcement of
the long and short haul clause would not be repugnant to the Constitution." The objection that the failure of Congress to specify
the circumstances under which the commission might relax the
prohibition of the statute makes it unconstitutional as a delegation
of legislative power was said to challenge every decided case since
the act of 1887. "The provisions as to undue preference and
discrimination," remarked Chief Justice White, "while involving,
of course, a certain latitude of judgment and discretion, are no
more undefined or uncertain in the section as amended than they
have been from the beginning." In characteristic vein he advanced the following argument to show that the contention of the
carrier is self-destructive:
"How can it otherwise be since the argument as applied to the
case before us is this: that the authority in question was validly
delegated so long as it was lodged in carriers, but ceased to be
susceptible of delegation the instant it was taken from the carriers
for the purpose of being lodged in a public administrative body?
Indeed, when it is considered that, in last analysis the argument
is advanced to sustain the right of carriers to exert the public
power which it is insisted is not susceptible of delegation, it is apparent that the contention is self-contradictory, since it reduces
16(1912) 234 U. S. 476, 58 L. Ed. 1408, 34 S. C. R. 986. See 2 Calif.
L. Rev. 491, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 110, and 9 Ill.
L. Rev. 276. The decision of
the same case in the Commerce Court is discussed in Jay Newton Baker,
"The Fourth Section, or the Long and Short Haul," 21 Yale L. J.278.
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itself to an effort to sustain the right to delegate a power by contending that the power is not capable of being delegated."' 7
This case was followed in United States v. Union Pacific R.
Co."8 decided on the same day. The decisions were unanimous but
were reached only after rearguments.' 9
The original Interstate Commerce Act forbade interstate carriers to receive from any person "a greater or less compensation"
for any transportation than that demanded of others for a like and
contemporaneous service. The Hepburn Act of 1906 changed
this so as to forbid "a greater or less or different compensation."
In Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley 20 this language was
held to render illegal the further fulfilment of a promise made
by an interstate carrier in 1871 as part of a settlement of a claim
for personal injuries to give to the claimant an annual pass during the remainder of his life. 21 In Chicago, I. & L. R. Co. v.
United States22 the same language was construed to forbid the
issuing of passes in payment of advertising. The operation of the
statute in the latter case was on an agreement made after its passage and no due-process issue appears to have been raised. The
company placed some reliance upon the fact that the Indiana
statute under which it was incorporated permitted passes in payment for advertising, but Mr. Justice Harlan answered that since
the transactions in question were interstate the acts of Congress
applicable thereto were paramount and no conflicting state statute
was of any avail. In the Mottley Case it was urged that it is a
denial of due process for Congress to make illegal a contract valid
when made, but Mr. Justice Harlan answered that all such contracts are subject to the future exercise of the legitimate powers
37(1912) 234 U. S.476, 486, 58 L. Ed. 1408, 34 S. C. R. 986.
18(1912) 234 U. S. 495, 58 L. Ed. 1426, 34 S. C. R. 995.

19For a discussion of the application of the principle of the separation

of powers to the authority delegated to the Interstate Commerce Commission, see Paca Oberlin, "Authorizing a Federal Commission to Fix Rates
is not a Delegation of Congressional Legislative Power in the Constitutional Sense," 73 Cent. L. J.III.
20(1911) 219 U. S. 467, 55 L. Ed. 297, 31 S. C. R. 265. See 9 Mich. L.
Rev. 615. The issue between the parties was before the Supreme Court
previously in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mottley, (1908) 211 U. S.149, 53 L.
Ed. 126, 29 S.C. R. 42, in which a suit to compel the specific performance
of the agreement to give the pass was held not to be within the jurisdiction
federal courts.
of the
2
1In 1 Va. L. Rev. 561, 568, is a discussion of a state decision requiring
a railroad to pay reasonable compensation for a right of way after an
agreement to give a pass in compensation therefor has been rendered invalid by statute.
22(1911) 219 U. S.486, 55 L. Ed. 305, 31 S. C. R. 272. A state decision
on a state statute to the same effect is considered in 24 Harv. L. Rev. 59.

TINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

of Congress over interstate commerce, since any other principle
would put it in the power of individuals by contracts between
themselves in anticipation of future legislation to "render of no
avail the exercise by Congress, to the full extent authorized by the
23
constitution, of its power to regulate commerce."
23

Several cases involved the question whether the differences of treatment complained of were unlawful discriminations or preferences under
the applicable statutes. Three cases sustained the Interstate Commerce
Commission in commands to put an end to discriminations found objectionable. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.,
(1912) 225 U. S.326, 56 L. Ed. 1107, 32 S. C. R. 742, involved lower rates
on coal intended for railroad consumption than on other coal. The court
thought that the differences with respect to facilities for delivery do not
make the traffic dissimilar in circumstances and conditions within the
meanipg of the act of 1887. The Los Angeles Switching Case, (1914) 234
U. S.294, 58 L. Ed. 1319, 34 S. C. R. 814, commented on in 3 Calif. L.
Rev. 50, held it unjustifiable to impose added charges for delivering cars
to industrial spur tracks when no extra charge is made for delivery to
team tracks and freight sheds. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., (1911) 220 U. S. 235, 55 L. Ed. 448, 31 S. C. R.
392, considered in 11 Colum. L. Rev. 574 and 24 Harv. L. Rev. 669,
condemned the refusal of the carrier to apply its carload rates to carload
lots of the goods of several owners assembled by a shipping agent.
In two cases in which action brought by a shipper was decided in
favor of the carrier, the underlying ground of decision was that victory
for the shipper would result in sanctioning a preference. Chicago & Alton
R. Co. v. Kirby, (1912) 225 U. S. 155, 56 L. Ed. 1033, 33 S.C. R. 648, was
an action for failure to fulfil a special contract to expedite a shipment of
horses, in which judgment for the carrier was affirmed on the ground
that under the Elkins Act of February 19, 1903, this was a service for
which a special higher rate might be charged, and the shipper in asking
for this special service at regular rates was seeking a discrimination in
his favor. The same case in the court below is discussed in 18 Va. L. Reg.
228. A shipper who complained that the agent of the carrier quoted him
a lower rate than that duly posted and thereby caused him loss when he
was compelled to pay the posted rates was sent away comfortless in Illinois Central R. Co. v. Henderson Elevator Co., (1913) 226 U. S. 441,
57 L. Ed. 290, 33 S. C. R. 176. A state decision to the same effect is
noticed in 27 Harv. L. Rev. 83. In 27 Harv. L. Rev. 177 is a note on
a decision that the intending shipper may refuse to ship and recover
damages for the misquoting of the rate.
A contract to ship at reduced rates the materials of a construction
company engaged in work for the carrier was held lawful in Santa Fe,
P. & P. R. Co. v. Grant Brothers Construction Co., (1913) 228 U. S.
177, 57 L. Ed. 787, 33 S. C. R. 474, when entered into in good faith as
part of the contract for the construction work. Such a shipment was
held to be not in the course of the railroad's duty as common carrier, and a
contract limiting liability for loss occasioned by the carrier's negligence
was sustained.
An instance of discrimination by extending credit to some shippers
but not to others is noted in 27 Harv. L. Rev. 754. The question of what is
a continuous shipment under the Elkins Act is discussed in 10 Mich. L.
Rev. 55. A case holding that cars owned by a shipper must be included in determining the distribution of cars among shippers is treated in
10 Colum. L. Rev. 256, 261.
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One of the provisions of the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906,
brought under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission any corporation or person engaged in the interstate transportation of oil by means of pipe lines and declared that such corporations or persons should be considered and held to be common
carriers within the meaning and purpose of the act. Under authority of the statute the Interstate Commerce Commission ordered a number of oil companies operating pipe lines to file
schedules of their rates and charges for transportation of oil. The
validity of these orders came before the court in The Pipe Line
Cases.2 4 One of the companies carried no oil except from its own

wells to its own refineries and was held not to fall "within the
description of the act, the transportation being merely an incident
to use at the end." "It would," observed Mr. Justice Holmes, "be
a perversion of language, considering the sense in which it is used
in the statute, to say that a man was engaged in transportation
whenever he pumped a pail of water from his well to his house."
Chief Justice White in a separate concurring opinion declared
that "the business thus carried on is transportation in interstate
commerce within the statute" but that "it would be impossible to
make the statute applicable to it without violating the due-process
clause of the fifth amendment, since to apply it would necessarily
amount to a taking of the property of the company without compensation." Congress, he insisted, cannot turn a purely private
business into a public business except by the exercise of the right
of eminent domain.
The other companies carried no oil except that which they derived from their own wells or purchased from owners of other
wells. As Mr. Justice Holmes put it, "they carry everybody's oil
to market, although they compel outsiders to sell it before taking
it into their pipes." This, he added, made them common carriers
in everything but form, and Congress may require those who are
common carriers in substance to become so in form. On the
commerce question he observed:
"That the transportation is commerce among the states we
think clear. That conception cannot be made wholly dependent
upon technical questions of title, and the fact that the oils transported belonged to the owner of the pipe line is not conclusive
24(1914) 234 U. S.548, 58 L. Ed. 1459, 34 S. C. R. 956. See 2 Calif.
L. Rev. 494, 14 Colum. L. Rev. 662, 687, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 104, and
13 Mich. L. Rev. 159. The case in the court below is considered in 26

Harv. L. Rev. 630, 655.
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against the transportation being such commerce. .

. The situa-

.

tion that we have described would make it illusory to deny the
title of commerce to such transportation, beginning in purchase
and ending in sale, for
the same reasons that make it transporta' 25
tion within the act."

On the due-process question Mr. Justice McKenna vigorously
disagreed in a manner prophetically reminiscent of his later
passionate dissent in the cases sustaining the regulation of rents.2
One or two of the complaining companies, he recognized, might
for special reasons have been common carriers before being declared to be so by Act of Congress, but he refrained from going
into details since he was without the power of decision. He
objected strenuously to the idea that a person using his private
property to carry his own products may be compelled to carry the
products of others at prices fixed by governmental authority. As
against the statement of Mr. Justice Holmes that the oil
companies used their ownership of pipe lines to require other producers of oil to sell to them on practically their own terms, thus
by duress making themselves master of the situation, Mr. Justice
McKenna declared:
"This is the charge. The facts of the case do not sustain it
except as they exhibit the advantages of the possession of property which others do not possess. Must it be shared by those
others for that reason? The conception of property is exclusiveness, the rights of exclusive possession, enjoyment, and disposition. Take away these rights and you take away all that there is of
property. Take away any of them, force a participation in any
of them, and you take property to that extent. .

.

. The em-

ployment of one's wealth to construct or purchase facilities for
one's business greater than others possess constitutes no
monopoly that does not appertain to all property. Such facilities
may give advantages, and, it may be, power; so does all property
and in proportion to its extent. .

.

. If the owner of a small

oil well may be given rights in the facilities of the appellee companies, why may not the owner of a small business be given
rights in the facilities of a larger business, if Congress sees fit to
say that the public welfare requires the gift? Can any privilege
be claimed for oil that cannot be claimed for other commodities?
"There is quite a body of opinion which considers the individual ownership of property economically and politically wrong
and insists upon a community of all that is profit-bearing. This
opinion has its cause, among other causes, in the power-may I
25(1914) 234 U. S. 548, 560, 58 L. Ed. 1459, 34 S. C. R. 956.
26
Block v. Hirsb, (1921) 256 U. S. 135, 65 L. Ed. 865, 41 S. C. R. 458;
Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, (1921) 256 U. S. 170, 65 L.
Ed. 877, 41 S. C. R. 465.
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say the duress?-of wealth. If it accumulates 51 per cent of political power, may it put its conviction into law and justify the law
by the advancement of the public welfare by 7destroying the
monopoly and mastery of individual ownership ?1'2
Though Mr. Justice Holmes had declared that the Hepburn
Act does not compel the pipe lines to continue in operation, but
merely requires them not to continue except as common carriers,
Mr. Justice McKenna referred to the commodities clause of the
Hepburn Act which forbids common carriers to carry their own
products and insisted that the result of sustaining that clause and
of reaching the present decision is that "by legal circumlocution
property legally devoted to the use of its owners is forbidden
such use and devoted wholly to the use of others." To this he
added the curt comment: "A queer outcome." 2
After holding in United States v. Adams Express Co. 29 that
Congress by the provision in the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906,
that "the term 'common carrier', as used in this act, shall include
express companies and sleeping car companies" had extended to
unincorporated express companies the provisions of the original
act of 1887 for criminal punishment of carriers indulging in unlawful discriminations, Mr. Justice Holmes referred to a possible
constitutional issue as follows:
27(1914) 234 U. S. 548, 571-573, 58 L. Ed. 1459, 34 S.C. R. 458.
2
8Orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission reducing rates
were sustained in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R.
Co., (1912) 222 U. S. 541, 56 L. Ed. 308, 32 S. C. R. 108, and Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville. R. Co., (1913) 227 U.
S. 88, 57 L. Ed. 431, 33 S. C. R. 185. Orders reducing rates were set
aside in Florida East Coast R. Co. v. United States, (1914) 234 U. S. 167,
58 L. Ed. 1267, 34 S. C. R. 867, because made without evidence in support, and in Southern Pacific Co: v. Interstate Commerce Commission,
(1911) 219 U. S. 433, 55 L. Ed. 283, 31 S. C. R. 288, commented on in 24
Harv. L. Rev. 581, because based on the erroneous assumption that the
commission has jurisdiction to protect lumber interests from a change
in rates and not because the new rates were found unreasonable.
Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. C. H. Albers Commission Co., (1912)
223 U. S. 573, 56 L. Ed. 556, 32 S. C. R. 316, held that under the Interstate
Commerce Acts of 1887 and 1889 rates are duly established by being
filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission and kept open to shippers in the office of the company even though not posted in a public
place as the law requires. In the absence of an established joint rate
over connecting lines the authorized rate is the sum of the two separate
rates of the two roads, and any agreement with a shipper to charge less
is void.
An order of the commission permitting consignors of pre-cooled shipments to ice cars at their warehouses before shipment when the roads
failed to furnish the service at substantially equal cost was affirmed in
Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States, (1914) 232 U. S. 199, 58
L. Ed. 568, 34 S. C. R. 291, commented on in 9 Ill. L. Rev. 48.
29 (1913) 229 U. S. 381, 57 L. Ed. 1237, 33 S. C. R. 878.
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"The power of Congress hardly is denied. The constitutionality of the statute as against corporations is established ... ,
and no reason is suggested why Congress has not equal power
to charge the partnership assets with a liability, and to personify the company so far as to collect a fine by a proceeding
against it by the company name. That is what we believe that
Congress intended to do. It is to be observed that the structure of the company under the laws of New York is such that
a judgment against it binds only the joint property ...
and that it has other characteristics of separate being..
The constitutionality of what is known as the Commodities
Clause of the Hepburn Act which before 1910 had been sustained
-after being warped in its interpretation so as not to prohibit
interstate' carriers from transporting certain commodities unless
they owned or were interested in the ownership of them at the
time of transportation-was reaffirmed in Delaware, L. & W. R.
Co. v. United States.31 In earlier cases the railroads had been
transporting commodities owned by them from the mines which
they also owned. In the principal case the road was carrying
hay which it acquired in Buffalo to a mine which it owned in
Scranton. Mr. Justice Lamar said that the act applies to tiansportation from market to mine as well as from mine to market
and that as to both it is a regulation of interstate commerce and
not a violation of the due-process clause of the fifth amendment.
In support he added:
"The commodity clause does not take property, nor does it
arbitrarily deprive the company of a right of property. The
statute deals with railroad companies as public carriers, and the
fact that they may also engage in private business does not compel Congress to legislate concerning them as carriers so as not to
interfere with them as miners or merchants. If such carrier hauls
for the public and also for its own private purposes, there is an
opportunity to discriminate in favor of itself against other shippers
in the rate charged, the facility furnished, or the quality of the
service rendered. The commodity clause was not an unreasonable
and arbitrary prohibition against a railroad company transporting
its own useful property, but a constitutional exercise of govern3OIbid., 390. In Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, (1931) 230 U. S. 324, 57 L. Ed. 1501, 33 S. C. R. 890, it was
held that the word "railroads" in the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887
does not include street railways, since they are not within the mischief
which the act sought to remedy and since many of the provisions of
the act are quite inapplicable to them. In 10 Mich. L. Rev. 498 is a note
to the same case in the court below. The topic is considered in Borden
D. Whiting, "Street Railways and the Interstate Commerce Act," 10
Colum. L. Rev. 450.
31(1913) 231 U. S. 363, 58 L. Ed. 269, 34 S. C. R. 65.
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mental power intended to cure or prevent the evils that might result if, in hauling goods in or out, the company occupied the dual
' 32
and inconsistent position of public carrier and private shipper.
Aftermaths of the earlier Commodity Cases came before the
court in United States v. Lehigh Valley R. Co.3 and United States
v. Erie Railroad Co. 4 which held that the statute forbids the roads
to transport coal owned by a corporation which is so completely
owned and managed by the roads as to be an alter ego of them.
While the constitutional issue was not mentioned, the necessary
3 5
inference is that the act so interpreted is constitutional.
The so-called Carmack Amendment to the Hepburn Act of
1906 required interstate carriers receiving property for interstate
transportation to issue a receipt and bill of lading therefor and
provided that the initial carrier should be liable for any loss,
damage or injury to the property caused by it or by any succeeding
connecting carrier, such initial carrier being given a right of reimbursement against the carrier on whose line the injury occurs.
32Ibid., 370.
33(1911) 220 U. S. 257, 55 L. Ed. 458, 31 S. C. R. 387. See 24 Harv.

L. Rev. 672.

34(1911) 220 U. S. 275, 55 L. Ed. 464, 31 S. C. R. 392.
35
The Commodities Clause excludes from its operation the shipment
of lumber which the carrier owns. Three cases have to do with questions of discrimination arising from situations in which roads carry
both their own lumber and that of others. Fourche River Lumber Co.
v. Bryant Lumber Co., (1913) 230 U. S. 316, 57 L. Ed. 1498, 33 S. C. R.
887, held that a railroad company the stock of which is owned by a
lumber company is entitled to retain its proportion of interstate freight
rates received for shipments made over its road by another lumber company, notwithstanding an agreement between the two lumber companies
that there should be no discrimination against either in the matter of
freight rates, since otherwise the, second lumber company would in effect
receive a rebate from the railroad company in violation of the Interstate
Commerce Act.
In The Tap Line Cases (United States v. Louisiana & P. R. Co.),
(1913) 234 U. S. 1, 58 L. Ed. 1185, 34 S. C. R. 741, commented on in 27
Harv. L. Rev. 579, 586, the court reversed the Interstate Commerce Commission in ordering through carriers to make no allowance to branch
lines owned by lumber companies for the transportation of their own
products over the branch lines. Such lines were found to be common
carriers carrying the products of others as well as of their owners, and
their owners would therefore be discriminated against as shippers if they
received no allowance for carriage over their own line and furnished that
transportation without remuneration as carrier while other shippers paid
for the entire haul of their products no more than the owners of the
lines paid. In effect the commission was requiring the owners of the tap
lines to charge themselves as shippers as much for the main haul as they
charged other shippers for the combined haul. The Supreme Court held
that as carriers they were entitled to get as much for hauling their own
products as for hauling those of others. The Tap Line Cases were followed
in United States v. Butler County R. Co., (1914) 234 U. S. 29, 58 L. Ed.
1196, 34 S. C. R. 748, decided on the same day.
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The amendment further provides that no contract, receipt or rule
shall exempt the initial carrier from the liability thus imposed by
the statute and that nothing in the section shall deprive the holder
of a bill of lading of any right under existing law. In Atlantic
36
Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside Mills this imposition of liability

on the initial carrier for the fault of a succeeding carrier was sustained and a stipulation in the bill of lading against such liability
was declared invalid as against the complaint that the enforcement
of the statute deprives the initial carrier of liberty of contract in
violation of the fifth amendment. Mr. Justice Lurton reminded
the company that there is no such thing as absolute freedom of
contract, that contracts against public policy are invalid at common
law, and that the power to regulate commerce includes power to
impose on interstate carriers duties reasonably adapted to promote
the welfare of commerce. After rehearsing the conditions out
of which the statute arose and the hardship on shippers over several connecting lines if they must discover and sue the particular
carrier in fault, the learned Justice laid down that the regulation
complained of imposes no unreasonable burden on the receiving
carrier, since that carrier collects the freight for the entire transportation, has frequent settlements of traffic balances with connecting carriers, has facilities for locating the carrier actually in
fault which the shipper lacks, and therefore enjoys a reasonable
security for reimbursement. The complaint that a carrier might
be held liable for the fault of a succeeding carrier which it had
no power to select or reject as participant in the through carriage
was put to one side as not applicable to the present case in which,
for all that appeared, the initial carrier had voluntarily made its
arrangements with the succeeding carrier in fault.37
The Riverside Mills Case was followed in Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Scott, s decided the same day, and in Galveston, H.
& S. A. R. Co. v. Wallace,39 decided a year later. In the latter
36(1911) 219 U. S. 186, 55 L. Ed. 167, 31 S. C. R. 164. See 1 Calif.
269, 11 Colum. L. Rev. 380, and 24 Harv. L. Rev. 404.
L. Rev.
3
7For general articles on the problem raised by the Riverside Mills
Case, see Frederick H. Cooke, "The Power of Congress and of the States
Respectively, to Regulate the Conduct and Liability of Carriers," 10 Colum.
L. Rev. 35; Edwin C. Goddard, "The Liability of the Common Carriers
As Determined by Recent Decisions of the Supreme Court," 15 Colum.
L. Rev. 399, 475; and Jacob S. New, "The Liability of the Initial Carrier Under the Interstate Commerce Act," 73 Cent. L. J. 4.
A case holding the initial carrier liable for a fire in a warehouse at
the destination of the shipment is discussed in 11 Mich. L. Rev. 255.
38(1911) 219 U. S. 209, 55 L. Ed. 183, 31 S. C. R. 171.
39(1912) 223 U. S. 481, 56 L. Ed. 516, 32 S. C. R. 205. See 1 Calif. L.
Rev. 269.
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case it was held that the act applies to a failure to deliver although
the shipper has not proved negligence. The act in effect makes
later carriers the agents of the initial carrier, and failure to deliver
is presumptively due to negligence. If it was "due to the act of
God, the public enemy, or some other cause against which" the
initial carrier "might lawfully contract, it was for the carrier to
bring itself within such exception." The Wallace Case held also
that the liability imposed by the federal statute may be enforced
in a state court.

40

The question reserved in the Riverside Mills Case was raised
again in Norfolk & Western R. C. v. Dixie Tobacco Co.41 in
which the shipment involved was over a route partly by sea which
was chosen by the shipper and was a different one from that which
the initial carrier would normally have adopted. The railroad
had no through route or rate established with the line of steamers.
It argued that "as it was bound to accept goods destined beyond its
own line for delivery to the next carrier, and was required by the
statute to give a through bill of lading, if, on such compulsory
acceptance, it is made answerable for damages done by others,
its property is taken without due process of law." Mr. Justice
Holmes contented himself with answering that in the Riverside
Case there "was the same stipulation" against liability beyond its
own lines "in the bill of lading, and the supposed through routes
were only presumed ;" that in the Wallace Case "the carrier is
spoken of as voluntarily accepting goods for a point beyond its
line, but there, too, there was the same attempt to limit liability,
and in the present case the acceptance was voluntary in the same
substantial distinction bedegree as in that," so that "there is no
42
tween the earlier decisions and this.

401n 6 Ill. L. Rev. 133 is a note on the jurisdiction of the state courts
to enforce liability based on the Carmack Amendment.
41(1913)
228 U. S. 593, 57 L. Ed. 980, 33 S. C. R. 609.
42
1n a series of cases the prohibition of the Carmack Amendment
against any contract or stipulation exempting the initial carrier from
liability for loss, damage or injury was construed not to prohibit or
make unlawful a contract or stipulation as to the agreed value of the
goods for the purpose of obtaining a choice of rates based on the value.
This interpretation was first put forth in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, (1913) 226 U. S. 491, 57 L. Ed. 314, 33 S. C. R. 148, which held
also that the Carmack Amendment covers the question of the liability
for interstate shipments and precludes the further application of state
law regulating such liability. The stipulation limiting recovery to the
agreed value was unlawful by the state law but was held not to be forbidden
by the Carmack Amendment. It was not, however, explicitly approved
by the Carmack Amendment. In holding the stipulation valid under federal law, the Supreme Court applied its views of what it thought the

20
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The original Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 authorized the
Interstate Commerce Commission to require interstate carriers to
common law ought to be, so that the controlling federal law is not an
act of Congress, but the Supreme Court's knowledge of the principles
of common law, which knowledge as contrasted with the contradictory
knowledge of the state court became the knowledge to apply because
the subject matter had passed from state to federal authority. The
Croninger Case is discussed in 1 Georgetown L. J. 169, 26 Harv. L. Rev.
456, 8 Ill. L. Rev. 123, 11 Mich. L. Rev. 460, 61 U. Pa. L. Rev. 501, and 18
Va. L. Reg. 778. The issue whether the carrier's liability is governed by
state or federal law is dealt with in 60 U. Pa. L. Rev. 39 and 18 Va. L.
Reg. 705. The question whether a shipper who undervalues the goods
shipped is guilty of a violation of the federal statute is considered in 5 Ill.
L. Rev. 240, 311, 372.
Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carl, (1913) 227 U. S. 639, 57 L. Ed.
683, 33 S. C. R. 391, considered in 11 Mich. L. Rev. 588, follows the Croninger Case in holding that the Carmack Amendment does not forbid
or render unlawful a stipulation as to an agreed valuation for the purpose
of determining the applicable rate and in applying the rule of the federal
courts that such stipulations are lawful and that a limitation of the recovery to the agreed valuation is not a release of the carrier for a part
of the loss due to negligence. The apparent impasse is apparently avoided by
saying that "the ground upon which such a declared or agreed value is upheld is that of estoppel." In this case Justices Hughes and Pitney dissented, but it is to be assumed that their difficulty was with regard to the
question whether the principle was applicable to the particular stipulation
rather than to the principle itself, since they had concurred in the Croninger Case. Both cases were decided only after a reargument. The
Carl Case was a suit against the ultimate carrier instrumental in causing the injury; the stipulation was imposed by the initial carrier, but
it stated that it was for the benefit of succeeding carriers and the Supreme Court declared that any lawful stipulation entered into by the
initial carrier enures to the benefit of succeeding carriers.
These semi-professed interpretations of the Carmack Amendment are
in reality the Supreme Court's ideas of common-law principles of the law
of carriers on matters on which the Carmack Amendment is silent.
Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co., (1913) 227 U. S. 469, 57 L.
Ed. 600, 33 S. C. R. 267, held that the shipper's acceptance of an express
receipt stating that the company "is not to be held liable beyond the sum of
$50, at not exceeding which sum said property is hereby valued, unless
a different value is hereinabove stated" is, in the absence of any statement
of higher value, equivalent to a declaration that the value does not exceed
$50, and the shipper is estopped from claiming more than that amount.
Great Northern R. Co. v. O'Connor, (1914) 232 U. S. 508, 58 L. Ed. 703,
34 S. C. R. 380, held that the carrier was justified in relying upon the signature of the shipper's agent to a bill of lading describing the goods as
household goods not exceeding a designated value, and in the absence of
special circumstances, was not required to make inquiry as to the value.
In Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Hooker, (1914) 233 U. S. 97, 58 L. Ed.
868, 34 S. C. R. 526, the rule of the previous cases was applied to baggage checked on a passenger's railroad ticket. The check was held to
be a sufficient receipt within the requirements of the Carmack Amendment, and the filing and posting of a tariff limiting the liability for lost
baggage to $100 when no higher value is stated and an excess rate paid
was found sufficient to estop the passenger from claiming more than
$100 although the lady in question had no actual knowledge of the tariff
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make annual reports and vested it with discretion to prescribe the
forms for keeping accounts and records. The Hepburn Act of
1906 reiterated this authorization and added a prohibition against
keeping accounts in other forms than those specified by the commission. It also extended the requirements to carriers transporting passengers and property partly by railroad and partly by water.
43
In Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit C0.

certain carriers objected that the requirements of the commission
exceeded the constitutional powers of Congress because they imposed the duty of giving information as to purely intra-state business. Mr. Justice Day answered that knowledge of the whole
business of interstate carriers is essential to the adequate regulation of their interstate business and that the requiring of information concerning intra-state business is not a regulation of that
business. The contention that Congress had unlawfully delegated
legislative power to the commission was answered by saying that
Congress bad laid down the general rule as to the keeping of accounts and vested the commission only with power to fill in details. It was also held that the complainants have no immunity
from federal supervision on the ground that Congress has no visitorial powers over state corporations. While it has no general
visitorial powers it may exercise such powers as are necessary
to regulate their interstate business. Justices Lurton and Lamar
dissented without opinion.
Still more elaborate complaints against the forms of accounting
and reporting required by the Interstate Commerce Commission
were held unfounded in Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. United
Statesa4 by an unanimous court. The major lament was that the
and neither made, nor was asked to make, any representations as to
the value. Mr. Justice Pitney filed an extended and vigorous dissent, in
which he insisted that a limitation of liability under such circumstances
is opposed to the Supreme Court's reiterated declarations of the common
law, is not only not sanctioned by anything in acts of Congress but is
opposed to the letter and the spirit of the Carmack Amendment, and is
not only not sanctioned by the Interstate Commerce Commission but is
covered by an adverse ruling handed down by it. The Supreme Court's
decision is discussed in 27 Harv. L. Rev. 737, 755, 9 Ill. L. Rev. 276, and
62 U. Pa. L. Rev. 638. The decision in the court below is considered in
25 Harv. L. Rev. 186 and 10 Mich. L. Rev. 133.
The limitation of the carrier's liability is dealt with in Edmund F.
Trabue, "Contract Limitation of Carrier's Liability, State and Federal,"
48 Amer. L. Rev. 50; and notes in 9 Mich. L. Rev. 233, and 62 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 727.
43(1912) 224 U. S. 194, 56 L. Ed. 729, 32 S. C. R. 436.
44(1913) 231 U. S. 423, 58 L. Ed. 296, 34 S. C. R. 125. See 27 Harv. L.
Rev. 369, 395.
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distinctions imposed by the commission between property accounts
and operating accounts required the companies to transfer to operating expenses a number of items that properly belonged in the
capital accounts. This, it was alleged, was so unreasonable and
arbitrary as to constitute an abuse rather than an exercise of the
powers conferred. Mr. Justice Pitney pointed out that the validity of the contention depended upon whether the regulations were
entirely at odds with fundamental principles of correct accounting.
After an elaborate examination he reached the conclusion that the
commission was justified in what it had done. The company's
contention was characterized as one resting on the unwarrantable
assumption that all capital expenditures result in permanent accretion to the property, thus ignoiing depreciation. The opinion
seems to have the idea that the bookkeeping required would not
control the rights of the company with respect to the rates to be
charged or the dividends that might be paid but merely required
it to set forth the facts as they actually were, though this is not
made very explicit. This issue is not treated by Mr. Justice Pitney as a constitutional one, but in one of the briefs it was alleged
that the unwarranted transfer of capital expenditures to operating
accounts would deprive holders of non-cumulative preferred stock
of property without due process of law by denying them dividends
to which actually they were entitled. In addition to disagreeing
with the analysis indulged in by the company, Mr. Justice Pitney
answered that the preferred stockholders were not before the court
and that Congress may deal with the carriers as distinct entities
without restraint on account of agreements among the stockholders
as to the apportionment of profits. The regulations of the commission merely prevent the proceeds of bond issues from being
used "to maintain dividend payments without that fact afppearing
in the accounts." Undoubtedly this will deter the company from
making such payments, but "since one of the very purposes of
establishing the accounting system is to deter the payment of
dividends out of capital, the criticism, upon analysis, bears its own
refutation." The decision that the commission had not abused the
discretion vested was accompanied by a reaffirmation that the
vesting of the discretion is not an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority.
(To be continued)

